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The Controversy over the Existence of the World (henceforth Controversy) is without a doubt Ingarden’s 
magnum opus; it is perhaps surprising, then, that so little attention has been given to its main goal, 
clearly indicated by the very title of the book: finding a solution to the centuries-old 
philosophical controversy about the ontological status of the external world. There are at least 
three reasons for this relative indifference. First, even at the time when the book was published, 
the Controversy was no longer seen as a serious polemical topic, whether it was disqualified as 
an archaic metaphysical pseudo-problem or taken to be the last remnant of an antiscientific 
approach to philosophy culminating in idealism and relativism. Second, Ingarden’s reasoning on 
the matter is highly complex, at times misleading, and even occasionally faulty. Finally, his 
analysis is not only incomplete – Controversy being unachieved – but also arguably aporetic. One 
may wonder, then, why it is still worth excavating this mammoth treatise to study an issue 
apparently no longer relevant to contemporary philosophy. Aside from historical and exegetical 
purposes, which are of course very interesting in their own right, Ingarden’s treatment of the 
Controversy remains one of the most detailed and ambitious ontological undertakings of the 
twentieth century. Not only does it lay out an incredibly detailed map of possible solutions to the 
Controversy, but it also tries to show why the latter is a genuine and fundamental problem that 
owes its hasty disqualification to various oversimplifications over the course of the history of 
philosophy. Whether Ingarden was right is a matter of personal judgment; but we can at least 
strive to do justice to his work by restituting his main arguments as clearly as possible. I will first 
give an overview of Ingarden’s method, which relies mainly on a fascinating combinatorial 
analysis. Then, I will proceed to summarize his examination of possible solutions to the 
Controversy, and determine which ones can be ruled out on ontological grounds. Finally, I will 
explain why this ambitious project ultimately leads to a theoretical impasse, leaving Ingarden 
unable to come up with a definitive solution to the Controversy – regardless of the fact that the 
book is unachieved. I will argue that his analysis of the problem yields a more modest but 
nonetheless valuable result. 
 
 
INGARDEN’S COMBINATORIAL METHOD 
 
 
Ingarden’s treatment of the Controversy closely follows his distinction between three 
foundational parts of philosophy: ontology, metaphysics and epistemology. The first step 
towards a solution thus consists in undertaking an ontological analysis of the problem, which is 
itself threefold. First, the existential-ontological analysis (carried out in the first volume of 
Controversy) has to explore existential moments and their possible combinations into different 
concepts of being. Then the formal-ontological analysis must shed some light on the form of the 
different kinds of entities revealed by the previous investigation: do they have the formal 
attributes of a thing, a process or a relation, and what are the formal boundaries of their mode of 
being? Finally, the material-ontological analysis is concerned with the qualitative determinations 
of entities, without which their form could not be “filled”.  
This ontological investigation is necessary but not sufficient to bring an end to the 
Controversy. Its fundamental purpose is to draw an exhaustive map of the possible solutions to 
the idealism-realism debate; existential, formal and material analyses should in turn rule out a lot 
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of possibilities as inconsistent, until a reasonable number of alternatives is reached – or even a 
single hypothesis. This result must nonetheless be refined by a metaphysical investigation in order 
to find out which of the possible solutions discovered so far is the true one. Even if the previous 
step proves to be sufficient to bring down the number of possibilities to a single one, a 
metaphysical analysis is still required to confirm this result on factual grounds: whereas ontology 
explores the realm of pure possibilities (and the necessary connections between them), 
metaphysics studies how things actually are. Finally, an epistemological analysis is needed to 
validate metaphysical knowledge – as Ingarden puts it epistemology “aims at achieving a critique 
of factually acquired knowledge”1.  
One might say that Ingarden’s task in the first volume of Controversy is first and foremost a 
clarification: the Controversy has often been unduly reduced to a simplistic alternative, the so-
called realism-idealism debate, with a limited understanding of the problem at hand. According 
to Ingarden, arguing over the existence of the world should not simply amount to asking 
whether the external world exists or not, but rather how it exists, if it does. In order to understand 
the various ways in which the world can stand relative to consciousness, and vice versa, one has 
to deploy a very fined-grained network of concepts pertaining to the mode of being of things in 
general. These conceptual units are called “existential moments”: they determine the way in 
which a given entity exists in itself and relatively to other things. Naturally existential moments 
can be compatible or incompatible; for something to have incompatible existential moments is 
an ontological contradiction, and hence can be ruled out a priori of the realm of possibilities. 
Concepts of being themselves are maximally inclusive combinations of compatible existential 
moments. The existential-ontological analysis thus follows two steps: first it has to give a list of 
all existential moments, then it must determine all the meaningful combinations between 
compatible moments into distinct concepts of being. However these two steps alone are not 
sufficient to discover the possible solutions to the Controversy; a third step is required, which 
consists in finding out what existential moments the world and consciousness can respectively 
have without entailing a contradiction in the resulting metaphysical worldview2.  
At the root of this combinatorial method lies a deep commitment to classical logic, and 
especially to the law of non-contradiction. Ruling out contradictions is the only way to narrow 
down the number of possibilities at the stage of the existential-ontological analysis, since 
Ingarden wants to proceed purely a priori, taking into account every possible combination 
however nonsensical it might seem at first glance. As a result of this meticulous method, 
Ingarden’s examination of the Controversy is extremely intricate, if not somewhat tedious, and 
his arguments are sometimes difficult to follow. I shall try to give a clear outline of his 




BASIC EXISTENTIAL MOMENTS AND THEIR COMBINATIONS 
 
 
In the most general terms, the crux of the Controversy is to determine “whether a ‘real’ world (or 
any ‘real’ entity whatever) can be ‘existentially independent’ of, or ‘dependent’ on, pure 
consciousness”3 . But this preliminary formulation centered on the concept of “existential 
dependence” is still too vague, for “the history of the problem is telling with regard to the 
                                                
1 Controversy, p. 83. 
2 Such a combinatorial approach to the ontological problem of the relation between consciousness and the world is 
not entirely unprecedented. For instance, one can find a relatively similar method (using fewer combinations) in C. 
D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925, pp. 607-50. Naturally, Ingarden’s 
phenomenological (transcendental) starting point is a significant difference between his approach and Broad’s. 
3 Ibid., p. 95. 




ambiguity of this expression” 4 . Indeed, there are no less than four different ways of 
understanding the ideas of dependence and independence in an ontological context. Ingarden 
sets out to define these four pairs of contradictory existential moments as a first step towards the 
clarification of the Controversy: 
1) autonomy – heteronomy (Seinsautonomie – Seinsheteronomie); 
2) originality – derivativeness (Seinsursprünglichkeit – Seinsabgeleitetheit); 
3) selfsufficiency – non-selfsufficiency (Seinsselbständigkeit – Seinsunselbständigkeit); 
4) independence – dependence (Seinsabhängigkeit – Seinsunabhängigkeit). 
A given entity can only have one of the two moments of each pair5; I will briefly recall the 
definitions of these moments without dwelling on the details, as this is not the focus of the 
present chapter6. An entity is autonomous if it exists by itself, whereas it is heteronomous if the 
foundation of its being (Seinsfundament) is in something else. It is original if it exists necessarily 
(without being created), and derived if it is contingent and created by something else. It is 
selfsufficient if it does not need to be part of a greater whole in order to exist; and non-selfsufficient if 
it necessarily coexists in a whole with something else. Finally, a selfsufficient being is independent if 
it does not require the existence of another selfsufficient being for the continuation of its own 
existence, and dependent if it does (this distinction does not apply to non-selfsufficient entities). In 
order to show more precisely how these pairs of existential moments are related, it is helpful to 
use formal definitions and equivalence relations7: 
 
Heteronomous(x, y) =def  x ≠ y and x has the foundation of its being in y 
∀x Autonomous(x) ≡ ~∃y [x ≠ y ∧ Heteronomous(x, y)] 
 
Derived(x, y) =def  x ≠ y and y creates x 
∀x Original(x) ≡ ~∃y [x ≠ y ∧ Derived(x, y)] 
 
∀x ∀y Non-selfsufficient(x, y) ≡ x ≠ y ∧ □∃z(x < z ∧ y < z) 
∀x Selfsufficient(x) ≡ ~∃y [x ≠ y ∧ Non-selfsufficient(x, y)] 
 
∀x ∀y Dependent(x, y) ≡ □(E!y → E!x) 
∀x Independent(x) ≡ ~∃y [x ≠ y ∧ Dependent(x, y)] 
  
According to Ingarden, there are eight ways to combine these existential moments into non-
contradictory “concepts of being” (Seinsbegriffe): 
I.      autonomy – originality – selfsufficiency – independence; 
                                                
4 Ibid., p. 109. 
5 They can also have none of the members of a pair in the case of non-selfsufficient beings, which are neither 
independent nor dependent. 
6 For a good overview of existential moments, see I. Johansson, “The Basic Distinctions in Der Streit”, Semiotica, 194, 
pp. 137-157; and A. Chrudzimski, 2015, “Ingarden on Modes of Being”, in Br. Leclercq, S. Richard and D. Seron 
(eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungles From Brentano to Carnap, Berlin, De Gruyter, pp. 199-222. 
7 In what follows, the mereological relation “<” is to be read as “is a part of” and the predicate “E!” means “to 
exist” (these formal definitions are partially inspired by Chrudzimski, op. cit.). I have systematically formalized the 
“negative” existential moments as relations, since they are always relativized to another entity or domain of being, 
while their “positive” counterparts are used by Ingarden as predicates in an absolute manner (for instance if a given 
entity is non-selfsufficient it is so only with respect to another entity, whereas if it is selfsufficient it is so absolutely). 
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II.    autonomy – derivativeness – selfsufficiency – independence; 
III.    autonomy – originality – non-selfsufficiency; 
IV.    autonomy – originality – selfsufficiency – dependence; 
V.    autonomy – derivativeness – selfsufficiency – dependence; 
VI.    autonomy – derivativeness – non-selfsufficiency; 
VII.   heteronomy – derivativeness – selfsufficiency – dependence; 
VIII.  heteronomy – derivativeness – non-selfsufficiency. 
From here, things get a little more complicated, as Ingarden applies this analysis to the 
resolution of the Controversy. The initial formulation of the problem was whether the real world 
is existentially dependent or independent vis-à-vis pure consciousness (“real world” and “pure 
consciousness” are understood here as the two domains of being that one can discriminate from 
the standpoint of immanent perception by adopting a phenomenological attitude). Ingarden can 
now frame the issue in a much more detailed way, armed with his four pairs of existential 
moments and with the eight concepts of being they constitute. The problem now amounts to 
discovering the mode of being of the real world and of pure consciousness respectively, which 
have to be compatible, as well as the relations that might obtain between the two domains. Since 
ontology is merely concerned with pure possibilities and necessary connections, this means that 
he has to examine every single combination of concepts of being for pure consciousness and the 
real world (whether they have the same or a different one). And since eight concepts of being 
have been discovered so far, this yields no less than 82 = 64 combinations. The two tables below 
should make the variables of this complex combinatory analysis clearer; the first one lists the 
eight possible existential configurations of the real world relatively to pure consciousness, with 
the name of each position in Ingarden’s terminology, and the second one similarly lists the 
possible configurations of pure consciousness vis-à-vis the real world, divided by Ingarden in 
eight nameless groups. 
 
The real world is… 
autonomous original selfsufficient  independent 
Absolute Realism (AR) yes yes yes yes 
Absolute Creationism (AC) yes no yes yes 
Dualist Unity Realism (DUR) yes yes no / 
Dependence Realism (DR) yes yes yes no 
Realist Dependence Creationism (RDC) yes no yes no 
Realist Unity Creationism (RUC) yes no no / 
Idealist Dependence Creationism (IDC) no no yes no 




Pure consciousness is… 
autonomous derived from the real world selfsufficient  independent 
Group I yes no yes yes 
Group II yes no yes no 
Group III yes yes yes yes 
Group IV yes yes yes no 
Group V yes no no / 
Group VI yes yes no / 
Group VII no yes yes no 
Group VIII no yes no / 
Table 2 




For the sake of clarity, I will introduce the following notation: each solution will be abridged 
by the initials of the underlying position (from Table 1) followed by the Roman numeral 
corresponding to its group (from Table 2). For instance, “AR-III” stands for the variant of 
Absolute Realism found in the third group of possible solutions to the Controversy. This way, 
for each solution, the letters indicate which existential moments the real world is assumed to 
have, while the Roman numeral similarly indicates which existential moments pure 
consciousness is assumed to have. This notation should make it easier to remember the exact 




THE FIRST STAGE OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS: ASSESSING 64 COMBINATIONS 
 
 
I will briefly review each group of solutions, following Ingarden’s own order of examination. In 
each group, a lot of hypothetical solutions can be ruled out on existential grounds, because their 
combination entails an ontological contradiction in one way or another. This is how Ingarden 
brings down the number of admissible solution from 64 to 158.  
The first group is composed of the solutions sharing the following assumption about pure 
consciousness: 
ASSUMPTION I.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, not derived from the real world, 
selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis the real world. 
Two solutions out of eight are deemed inadmissible in this group: Dualist Unity Realism 
(DUR-I) and Dependence Realism (DR-I). Ingarden’s explanation of the contradiction plaguing 
the former is somewhat confusing. According to DUR-I, the real world must coexist in a whole 
with pure consciousness; but the real world is also supposed to be original, thus it is a necessary 
being, while it is assumed that pure consciousness is not derived from the real world. Ingarden 
adds that pure consciousness is unlikely to be original; if not, then it is derived from something 
else than the real world, a “third factor”. Since the real world, a necessary existent, can only be 
required to coexist in a whole with another necessary existent, pure consciousness must owe the 
necessity of its own existence to this third factor from which it is derived. But Ingarden still finds 
this picture unconvincing, because the existence of the real world would still depend, in a way, 
on another being (by being non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis pure consciousness). This is why, 
according to him, DUR-I can be ruled out on existential grounds. Ingarden makes two 
assumptions in this demonstration: first, that pure consciousness is not original, and second that 
a given entity can only be non-selfsufficient relatively to another if it is derived while the second 
is original. One could argue that both of these assumptions go beyond the scope of an 
existential-ontological analysis. The first one is in fact motivated earlier, in the §18 of Controversy, 
where Ingarden mentions the phenomenon of sleep – during which consciousness temporarily 
falls out of existence. He argues that the sheer possibility of the disappearance of consciousness 
should rule out its originality, since original beings exist necessarily, hence eternally. The second 
assumption is justified by the following biconditional, which is endorsed by Ingarden as what we 
will call an “existential axiom”: 
(1)  ∀x ∀y [Non-selfsufficient(x, y) ≡ ~Original(x) & Original(y)] 
                                                
8 This analysis is carried out in §§18-26 of Controversy. 
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However, Ingarden himself admits in his ontology a class of entities which are both original 
and non-selfsufficient, namely ideal states of affairs9. Thus he seems to implicitly assume that the 
world is not merely composed of ideal states of affairs, even if he does not clearly explains why 
this should be the case (this hypothesis will nonetheless be confirmed by the formal-ontological 
analysis of the real world). 
Unfortunately, the case of DR-I is not really more straightforward. According to DR-I, the 
real world depends on pure consciousness for its continued existence. Ingarden applies to this 
case the same reasoning: since the real world is assumed to be original, its existence cannot 
depend on another being10. This validates the following entailment: 
(2)   ∀x ∀y [Dependent(x, y) → ~Original(x)] 
Here too, there seems to be an inconsistency: Ingarden also admits in his ontology entities which 
are both original and dependent, namely ideal relations. Even if the assumption that the world is 
not entirely composed of ideal relations seems relatively unproblematic11, it does not strictly fall 
within the scope of an existential-ontological analysis. 
The six admissible solutions from the first group are slightly easier to grasp. The first variant 
of Absolute Realism, AR-I, is a very strong kind of dualism: both pure consciousness and the 
real world are autonomous, original (or at least, in the case of consciousness, not derived from 
the world), selfsufficient and independent. In other words, both are necessary beings, and neither 
depends in any way on the other: pure consciousness could exist without the real world, and vice 
versa. The first variant of Absolute Creationism, AC-I, is similar in every respect except for the 
fact the real world is not original but derived from pure consciousness. This means that 
consciousness literally creates the world as an autonomous being (as opposed to some kind of 
purely intentional being). Ingarden notes that this solution has never been seriously advocated by 
anyone in the history of philosophy, although he adds that it might bear a (misleading) 
resemblance with Hegel’s so-called “objective idealism” 12 . The first version of Realist 
Dependence Creationism (RDC-I) is a related view according to which pure consciousness 
creates the world as existentially dependent from it. Ingarden remarks that this theory is 
analogous to the versions of theological creationism admitting the doctrine of creatio continua (the 
world is not only created by God, but also permanently depends on Him for its continued 
existence). But here too, it is hard to think of any advocate of the view when we substitute 
“God” for “consciousness”. The first variant of Realist Unity Creationism (RUC-I) is even more 
puzzling: pure consciousness creates the world as non-selfsufficient relative to it. This means 
that the real world is not only derived from pure consciousness but necessarily coexists with it in 
the unity of a whole – while still being autonomous. Ingarden does not say much about the 
details of this solution. The concept of being of the real world according to Realist Unity 
Creationism coincides with what later chapters of Controversy define as the concept of being of 
                                                
9 See the appendix for a synoptic overview of Ingarden’s ontology. The “existential axioms” hold for existential 
moments regarding the real world and pure consciousness, but one should bear in mind that they do not necessarily 
hold for any entity. 
10 In the original Polish version of Controversy (henceforth Spór), Ingarden merely says that an original entity cannot 
depend on a derivative entity; however, I have chosen to focus on the German version in this chapter (henceforth 
Streit), since it can be considered as Ingarden’s last word on the matter. Besides, his justification of the existential 
axiom (2) in Streit is quite convincing: since an original entity exists necessarily, it is doubtful that it can depend 
existentially on another entity, be it original itself. This is why the case of ideal relations can seem rather problematic.  
11 One might try to advocate a kind of relational idealism or “panrelationalism” according to which the world is 
indeed entirely composed of ideal relations. The problem with such a view is that according to Ingarden ideal 
relations are original but nonetheless dependent on their relata. But if the world is merely constituted by relations, 
what would these relata be? The only option is to say that the relata of the world’s relational constituents are 
conscious experiences themselves, but this hardly makes any sense. In any case, the formal analysis of the real world 
will rule out the possibility of such a far-fetched hypothesis. 
12 Controversy, p. 175. 




real events and individual properties (tropes): events and properties are indeed autonomous, 
derivative and non-selfsufficient, because they coexist in a larger whole (processes for events, 
individual objects for properties)13. This is hardly helpful to understand RUC-I, but its putative 
impossibility can only be decided by a formal analysis.  
The last two admissible solutions of the first group are different, because they assume the 
“real” world to be heteronomous; in other words, they venture into the territory of idealism. 
According to Idealist Dependence Creationism (IDC-I), pure consciousness creates the real 
world as a heteronomous being which existentially depends on it. Ingarden believes that this 
solution is very close to Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Idealist Unity Creationism (IUC-I) is 
similar except for the assumption that the real world is non-selfsufficient (rather than dependent) 
vis-à-vis pure consciousness. This is simply an idealist version of RUC-I, and the same questions 
regarding the interpretation of the world’s non-selfsufficiency arise again, although they seem 
less puzzling once we admit that the world is merely heteronomous. According to Ingarden, the 
closest historical doctrine to IUC-I can be found in Berkeley’s immaterialism. It is worth noting 
in passing that Ingarden does not seriously consider a third kind of idealism, namely what we can 
call “Idealist Independence Creationism”, according to which the world is heteronomous, 
selfsufficient and derived from pure consciousness, but also independent from it – meaning that 
it does not requires it for its continued existence. He does concede that the impossibility of such 
a solution cannot be ruled out on existential grounds: only a material analysis of pure 
consciousness can tell us whether a heteronomous object derived from conscious experiences 
requires the enactment of such experiences simply for its genesis or also for its continued 
existence. Ingarden conjectures that the latter is true, but there also seems to be an existential-
ontological motivation for the rejection of such a view: if a given entity is heteronomous, not 
only should it be derivative, but it should also be dependent – for how could something have the 
foundation of its existence outside itself and yet be existentially independent? This is true in 
virtue of two other existential axioms already mentioned in §16 of Controversy: 
(3)   ∀x ∀y [Heteronomous(x, y) → Derived(x, y)] 
(4)   ∀x ∀y [Heteronomous(x, y) ∧ Selfsufficient(x) → ~Independent(x)] 
There is one additional and unique solution in the first group: the so-called “Negative 
Solution”, according to which the real world does not exist. Ingarden does not consider non-
being as a distinct concept of being, but rather as the privation of all existential moments. This 
“solution” to the Controversy, beyond both realism and idealism, amounts to denying any kind 
of intentionality to consciousness. Conscious experiences would have no directedness towards 
anything; it would be, so to speak, only directed “inwards” – although this formulation is also 
deficient since it conveys the idea of some kind of conscious activity. It is hard to get a grip on 
the Negative Solution, as Ingarden himself admits, for we are constantly tempted to interpret it 
as an idealist position according to which the world is merely heteronomous. Ingarden mentions 
that the closest historical doctrine is to be found in Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism, but this is 
only a superficial similitude because neutral monism abolishes the distinction between 
consciousness and the world. 
Having reviewed each position as it appears in the first group of solutions, it will be easier to 
examine the seven remaining groups of solutions. The second group starts with the following 
assumption: 
ASSUMPTION II.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, not derived from the real world, 
selfsufficient and dependent on the real world. 
                                                
13 See the appendix. 
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In this group, only two solutions are admissible on existential grounds: AR-II and DR-II. AR-II 
stems from the assumption that pure consciousness is autonomous, selfsufficient, not created by 
the real world but nonetheless dependent on it for its continued existence, while the real world 
itself is autonomous, original, selfsufficient and independent. Recall that Ingarden has previously 
introduced the following axiom: 
(2)   ∀x ∀y [Dependent(x, y) → ~Original(x)] 
This entailment applies to the real world, but there is no reason why it should not apply to pure 
consciousness as well. As previously noted, only ideal relations violate (2), and it would be 
certainly difficult to conceive how conscious experiences might be ideal relations. Besides, 
Ingarden has already assumed that pure consciousness is not original, and he used this 
assumption to rule out DUR-I. Therefore, in AR-II consciousness existentially depends on the 
real world, but is derived from something else (e.g. God). 
DR-II assumes that pure consciousness and the real world are mutually dependent. Applying 
the axiom (2), this means that a slight modification must be made in the assumptions of 
Dependence Realism in order to make this solution admissible: the real world is not original in 
the strict sense, but merely not derived from pure consciousness14. Both pure consciousness and 
the real world are thus created by something else, whether it is the same third factor or two 
distinct domains. Since they are mutually dependent from an existential point of view, DR-II 
makes a little more sense if we suppose that a single third factor, such as God, has created both 
of them as such. Indeed, in order to be mutually dependent, pure consciousness and the real 
world must be created at the exact same time, since they require each other for their continued 
existence. DR-II thus seems compatible with a particular kind of theism according to which God 
creates the world and pure consciousness in such a way that the annihilation of one entails the 
annihilation of the other. This is, to say the least, an original theory. 
Other solutions from the second group are easily ruled out. Variants of creationism and 
idealism (AC-II, RDC-II, RUC-II, IDC-II and IUC-II) are straightforwardly contradictory 
because pure consciousness cannot depend on a world that it has itself created, in virtue of the 
following existential axiom: 
(5)   ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) → ~Dependent(y, x)] 
Likewise, DUR-II is impossible because pure consciousness cannot depend on the real world if 
the latter is required to coexist with it in a whole: 
(6)   ∀x ∀y [Dependent(x, y) → Selfsufficient(x) ∧ Selfsufficient(y)] 
This entailment is evident from the definition of existential moments: only selfsufficient entities 
can be either dependent or independent.  
The third group assumes that pure consciousness is derived from the real world: 
ASSUMPTION III.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, derived from the real world, 
selfsufficient and independent vis-à-vis the real world. 
In this group, only Absolute Realism (AR-III) is admissible. It is, in a way, the symmetrical 
position of AC-I: the real world creates pure consciousness, but the latter remains autonomous, 
selfsufficient and independent. This means that it does not require the world for the 
continuation of its existence, but only for its creation. All the other solutions of this group can 
be dismissed. Creationist and idealist solutions (AC-III, RDC-III, RUC-III, IDC-III and IUC-
III) are ruled out because if pure consciousness is derived from the real world, the opposite is 
obviously false (existential derivation is clearly not a symmetric relation): 
                                                
14 We will come back later to the significance of this alteration. 




(7)   ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) → ~Derived(y, x)] 
DUR-III is ruled out because pure consciousness cannot be derived from the real world if the 
latter is non-selfsufficient with respect to it (in order for y to create x, it must be able to exist 
without x, thus excluding the necessity of its coexistence with x in a whole): 
(8)   ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) → ~Non-selfsufficient(y, x)] 
Finally, DR-III is ruled out for the same reason which already plagued five solutions of the 
second group, in virtue of the axiom (5) – if pure consciousness is derived from the real world, 
the latter cannot depend on it. 
The fourth group is easy to review: it maintains the assumption that pure consciousness is 
derived from the real world, while adding that it also depends on it. 
ASSUMPTION IV.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, derived from the real world, 
selfsufficient and dependent on the real world. 
Since pure consciousness is still assumed to be derived from the real world, all the solutions are 
ruled out except AR-IV, for the same reasons than in the third group. AR-IV, however, is an 
interesting and familiar position: the world can exist on its own, but if consciousness exists it is 
not only derived from the world, but also dependent on it. Ingarden notes that this solution is 
close to the materialist worldview, and in particular to what he labels “epiphenomenalism”. It is 
worth insisting on the fact that according to such a view, the existence of matter does not 
necessarily bring about consciousness, since it can exist without it. Consciousness is a mere 
“epiphenomenon” of the world, and its existence is contingent. However, Ingarden adds that the 
analogy with a materialist form of epiphenomenalism is superficial, for the “real world” is not 
entirely material. Indeed, the materialist only wants to attribute “absolute being” (i.e. autonomy, 
originality, selfsufficiency and independence) to matter, not to the whole real world, which can 
also include ideal objects for instance. This important precision means that material 
epiphenomenalism is only a special instance of AR-IV, but it does not rule it out. After all, the 
generic description of AR-IV does not specify exactly what creates pure consciousness and on 
what it depends: it could either be the whole real world, or simply some part of it. In the latter 
case, it could be the material world – and this is a very sensible hypothesis. Such a theory is still 
popular in contemporary philosophy of mind, under the guise of emergentism. It should also be 
noted that Ingarden’s mentions of “epiphenomenalism” and “materialism’” are ambiguous; 
indeed, according to AR-IV, pure consciousness is existentially autonomous. It really exists, and 
really has the properties it is assumed to have. Even if it turns out that the real world is entirely 
physical, the fact that a non-physical existential domain such as pure consciousness exists 
autonomously means that AR-IV is incompatible with what contemporary philosophers call 
“physicalism” – the idea that everything is physical, or alternatively that only physical entities 
exist. Thus this solution might be called “materialist” in some cases if it merely means that 
consciousness emerges from matter, not that everything is matter: emergentism is perfectly 
compatible with dualism15. Therefore AR-IV appears as a strong candidate to resolve the 
Controversy. 
The fifth group of solutions starts with the postulate that pure consciousness is non-
selfsufficient with regard to the world: 
ASSUMPTION V.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, not derived from the real world, and 
non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world. 
Two solutions are admissible in this group: Absolute Realism (AR-V) and Realist Unity 
Creationism (RUC-V). AR-V supposes that pure consciousness necessarily coexists in a whole 
with the real world, while the latter is selfsufficient and independent relative to it. Such an 
                                                
15 See below the analysis of AR-VII for a “physicalist” counterpart of AR-IV. 
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asymmetry can seem problematic: the “mereological bond” between consciousness and the 
world is necessary for the first but contingent for the second. Recall that in his examination of 
DUR-I, Ingarden had implicitly appealed to the following biconditional as an existential axiom: 
(1)   ∀x ∀y [Non-selfsufficient(x, y) ≡ ~Original(x) & Original(y)] 
Since pure consciousness is supposed not to be derived from the real world in AR-V, this means 
that it is derived from a third factor, which has to be original itself. Thus pure consciousness is 
created by a third factor in such a way that it needs to coexist in a whole with the real world, 
while the real world can exist on its own. As Ingarden admits, there are a lot of open questions 
surrounding this solution, but these can only be answered by a material-ontological analysis. 
RUC-V offers a more complex picture: pure consciousness creates the real world, while they 
both are non-selfsufficient with regard to each other. This combination is apparently 
problematic: in order for pure consciousness to create the real world, it has to exist, but since it 
is also non-selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world it needs it to exist in the first place. Ingarden 
considers that one cannot rule out this solution on existential grounds, but he does not explain 
clearly why this is the case, even in the original Polish version of Controversy in which he dedicates 
more space to this solution. Even worst, Ingarden seems to contradict himself, because as we 
have seen he has already rejected DUR-III by appealing to the following entailment: 
(8)   ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) → ~Non-selfsufficient(y, x)] 
This should straightforwardly rule out RUC-V, in which the real world is derived from pure 
consciousness while the latter is non-selfsufficient relative to it. In fact, Ingarden also appeals to 
(8) to rule out another solution of the fifth group, namely AC-V, according to which pure 
consciousness creates the real world and is non-selfsufficient relative to it, while the real world is 
selfsufficient. The only difference in RUC-V is that the non-selfsufficiency is reciprocal – but why 
should this detail save the solution? If we follow Ingarden, we should modify (8) in the following 
way:  
(8*)  ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) ∧ ~Non-selfsufficient(x, y) → ~Non-selfsufficient(y, x)] 
But (8*) is ultimately unwarranted: it looks like an ad hoc axiom to save RUC-V and prevents 
Ingarden from committing a fallacy. Even with a charitable reading of the text, it is hard to see 
why RUC-V should be deemed admissible on existential grounds, as this seemingly threatens the 
consistency of the whole analysis. 
The rest of the solutions from the fifth group are ruled out by Ingarden. I have already 
mentioned that Absolute Creationism (AC-V) is disqualified precisely because of (8). 
Dependence Realism (DR-V), according to which pure consciousness is non-selfsufficient vis-à-
vis the real world while the latter is dependent on it, is ruled out in virtue of the axiom (6). The 
same axiom also undermines both variants of dependence creationism (RDC-V and IDC-V), 
which assume that the real world is derived from pure consciousness and dependent on it, while 
pure consciousness is non-selfsufficient relative to the world. Idealist Unity Creationism (IUC-V) 
is an interesting case, because it is similar to RUC-V in every respect except for the fact that the 
real world is also supposed to be heteronomous. Here Ingarden seems to concede that this 
solution can simply be ruled out by appealing to (8) – in which case RUC-V should also be ruled 
out – but he adds that it should be ruled out anyway in virtue of the following axiom: 
(9)   ∀x ∀y [Autonomous(x) ∧ ~Autonomous(y) → ~Non-selfsufficient(x, y)] 
It seems indeed difficult to admit that an autonomous entity and a heteronomous one could 
coexist within the unity of a single whole, let alone necessarily coexist in such a way. 
This leaves us with the case of Dualist Unity Realism (DUR-V). This solution is interesting 
because its configuration is quite similar to that of DR-II, which Ingarden had judged admissible 




on existential grounds, while he dismisses DUR-V. According to DUR-V, pure consciousness 
and the real world are mutually non-selfsufficient, while they are both autonomous and not 
derived from each other. In virtue of the existential axiom (1), this means that neither pure 
consciousness nor the real world can be original. On the face of it, then, RUC-V is contradictory, 
since the real world is supposed to be original. But just like in the case of DR-II, a weakened 
version seems to be admissible, in which the world is merely not derived from consciousness. Pure 
consciousness and the real world would be both created by a something else, probably by the 
same third factor, in such a way that they are mutually non-selfsufficient. A simple way to picture 
this view is to imagine that some absolute being (e.g. God) creates a whole constituted by pure 
consciousness and the real world, such that the parts must belong to the whole in order to exist. 
Surprisingly, Ingarden does not mention this possibility, even though he has stated in his 
examination of DR-II that only a material investigation can determine whether the real world is 
original or merely not derived from pure consciousness. This is why he had cautiously concluded 
that the weakened version of DR-II, according to which both existential domains are derived 
from a third factor, is “possibly not inadmissible from the existential point of view”16. Therefore, 
for the sake of coherence, the weakened version of DUR-V must also be judged admissible, 
despite Ingarden’s hasty dismissal17. 
The sixth group assumes that pure consciousness is not only non-selfsufficient, but also 
created by the real world: 
ASSUMPTION VI.  Pure consciousness is autonomous, derived from the real world, and non-
selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world. 
Once again, only Absolute Realism (AR-VI) is admissible in this group. According to this 
solution, the real world – which is autonomous, original, selfsufficient and independent – creates 
pure consciousness in such a way that it necessarily coexists with it in a whole. It is not obvious 
to see how this position differs from AR-IV (according to which consciousness is selfsufficient 
but existentially depends on the world). The problem is that the non-selfsufficiency of pure 
consciousness vis-à-vis the real world might seem a little mysterious. On the face of it, AR-VI 
appears to be compatible with a kind of dual aspect theory according to which fundamental 
properties are both mental and physical, meaning that the mental and the physical do “coexist in 
a whole”. Such a theory would also be consistent with AR-V; but in both cases we only have 
what Ingarden calls a “unilateral” non-selfsufficiency, meaning that the real world could exist 
outside of a whole including pure consciousness. Note that this is not the case of DUR-V, which 
displays a symmetrical non-selfsufficiency and thus is in principle the best existential model for a 
dual aspect theory (or neutral monism on some interpretations of it). The theory of property 
dualism, in its emergentist version, might be a better fit for AR-VI. In any case, the details of 
AR-VI are left to a material-ontological investigation. 
All the variants of creationism (AC-VI, RDC-VI, RUC-VI, IDC-VI, IUC-VI) are obviously 
contradictory in this group, because if pure consciousness is derived from the real world it 
cannot be the other way around – see the axiom (7). Dualist Unity Realism (DUR-VI) is 
impossible in virtue of the axiom (1): if the real world is original, it cannot be non-selfsufficient. 
Finally, Dependence Realism (DR-VI) is ruled out because of the axiom (6): the real world’s 
dependence on pure consciousness presupposes the selfsufficiency of both. 
The last two groups of possible solutions to the Controversy are special because they both 
assume that pure consciousness is heteronomous. Ingarden regards this assumption as 
inconsistent with the phenomenological data. In the §18 of Controversy, he endorses the 
assumption that “the pure experiences under consideration are autonomous”18, but adds in a 
                                                
16 Controversy, p. 200. 
17 I shall come back to the issue of the “weakened versions” in the section 5. 
18 Controversy, p. 168. 
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footnote that “the time will come when we drop this assumption”19. When he turns to the 
examination of the seventh and eighth groups, he mentions that they appear to be ruled out by 
experience. He nevertheless makes some remarks about the solutions of these groups. What 
does it mean, exactly, to say that pure consciousness is heteronomous? The “reality” of a 
heteronomous entity is only bestowed upon it by some kind of enactment; for instance, the 
purely intentional object “Hamlet” is conceived as a “real” object having the property of being a 
man by means of a conscious act which enacts the content of a literary work of art. But Hamlet 
is not a real, persistent object; the foundation of its being is not in itself, but a conscious act of 
presentation. However a heteronomous entity is not necessarily an intentional object: it does not 
necessarily depends on some kind of conscious act. For instance, empirically possible objects, 
events and properties are heteronomous: they are not real, but they still exist in a lesser way. This 
might help us to make sense of the hypothesis that pure consciousness is heteronomous; it 
implies that consciousness as we experience it is nothing more than some kind of illusion, 
meaning that the properties we attribute to it, even from a philosophical standpoint, are not 
properties it really has but merely properties it seems to have – just like a possible horse does not 
really instantiate the property of being a real horse. Ingarden believes that such a hypothesis is 
absurd because it is ruled out by experience: we experience consciousness as an autonomous 
existential domain. Other philosophers and scientists, however, strongly disagree with this 
opinion. Some have argued extensively, for instance, that subjective consciousness is simply an 
elaborate illusion generated by a specialized neural network in the human brain20. More generally, 
reductive physicalism is an umbrella term for theories according to which the mental is in some 
way entirely reducible to the physical. This does not mean, in Ingarden’s lexicon, that they do 
not exist at all, for we are still tricked into believing that we are undergoing such states, and that 
they are real; it seems fairer to characterize this view as advocating the heteronomy of 
consciousness. Moreover, Ingarden does not clearly explain how we are supposed to experience 
the autonomy of pure consciousness; after all, the defining feature of an illusion is that it 
mystifies us. All in all, the dismissal of the last two groups of possible solutions on the basis of 
experience is at least controversial, and as such they are worthy of examination. Besides, 
Ingarden himself acknowledges the popularity of theories advocating something like the 
existential heteronomy of consciousness:  
“A form of materialism shows up in the annals of philosophy, especially of the 19th century, 
in which consciousness is not only regarded as something whose existence is considered in 
some indeterminate sense ‘meaner’ or ‘weaker’ than the existence of matter. It is said in this 
connection that consciousness is a kind of ‘phosphorescence’ of matter, an epiphenomenon 
of the latter, or even a ‘function’ of the highly organized matter. Yet what this is all supposed 
to mean is neither stated, nor further investigated. One also does not employ the concept of 
heteronomy in this context, and this for the sole reason that materialism does not carry out 
any sort of analysis of mode of being. Despite this, it would appear that the dominant 
tendency in materialism is to essentially degrade the being of consciousness in comparison 
with the being of matter21.” 
The seventh group assumes that the heteronomous pure consciousness depends on the real 
world: 
ASSUMPTION VII.  Pure consciousness is heteronomous, derived from the real world, 
selfsufficient and dependent on the real world. 
In this group, Absolute Realism (AR-VII) is not ruled out on existential grounds. It is essentially 
a variation on AR-IV (the “epiphenomenalist” view), except for the fact that pure consciousness 
is now supposed to be merely heteronomous. According to this view, the mode of being of 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Cf. Th. Metzinger, 2003, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press. 
21 Controversy, p. 219. 




conscious experiences is similar to the one of purely intentional objects or processes. AR-VII is 
probably best understood as a general framework for reductive physicalism, allowing the 
possibility of explaining the phenomenon of consciousness in purely physical terms. It might be 
suitable in particular for a functionalist approach to consciousness, since Ingarden takes 
processes to be precisely derivative, selfsufficient and dependent. Functionalism is the idea that 
mental states are best understood in terms of their functional role, which can be realized by 
different underlying physical systems – be it a silicon-based processor in a computer or an 
assembly of neurons in a biological brain – as long as they have the adequate structure. Ingarden 
himself hints at this idea in the previously quoted passage, when he speaks of consciousness as a 
function of highly organized matter. If the mental is a mere function of the physical, then it is 
indeed heteronomous, derived, selfsufficient and dependent: consciousness is a process, but has 
the foundation of its being in the structure of the world (or at least some parts of the world, such 
as the nervous system). It is not a “real” process like the movement of a physical body from one 
point to another, but a heteronomous one, which existentially depends on its realization by 
physical processes such as the firing of neurons. 
The rest of the solutions from the seventh group are inadmissible. All variants of realist 
creationism (AC-VII, RDC-VII and RUC-VII) are obviously dismissed because an autonomous 
entity cannot be derived from a heteronomous one: 
(10)  ∀x ∀y [Derived(x, y) ∧ Autonomous(x) → Autonomous(y)] 
Dualist Unity Realism (DUR-VII) is ruled out because an autonomous entity cannot coexist with 
a heteronomous entity in a single whole – see the axiom (9). The two variants of idealist 
creationism (IDC-VII and IUC-VII) are straightforwardly disqualified in virtue of the axiom (7): 
pure consciousness, being derived from the real world, cannot create it. Finally, Dependence 
Realism (DR-VII) is ruled out because the real world cannot depend on pure consciousness if it 
creates it – see the axiom (5). 
The eighth and final group of solutions starts with the assumption that the heteronomous 
pure consciousness is non-selfsufficient relative to the real world: 
ASSUMPTION VIII.  Pure consciousness is heteronomous, derived from the real world and non-
selfsufficient vis-à-vis the real world. 
Once more, Absolute Realism (AR-VIII) is the only admissible solution in this group. It is a 
variation on AR-VI, according to which consciousness is derived from the world and needs to 
coexist with it in a whole, only in the present case consciousness is also heteronomous. Being 
both derivative and non-selfsufficient, consciousness is again best understood as a set of mental 
properties needing to coexist with objects in the world. This is also a very interesting solution, 
because it comes closest to what contemporary philosophers of mind call “supervenience 
physicalism”. According to this generic theory, everything is physical and mental properties 
supervene on the physical. In other words, no two possible worlds can differ in their physical 
properties without differing in their mental properties as well. Supervenient properties are merely 
global or higher order properties of a given base; in the current case, mental properties are global 
properties supervening on the basic physical structure of the world, but they do not have any 
kind of existence independently of this structure. The relation of supervenience captures both 
the idea of derivation and the idea of dependence in Ingarden’s vocabulary: if y supervenes on x, 
then y cannot exist without x. But it also captures the concept of heteronomy: a supervenient 
entity does not have the foundation of its being in itself, but in what it supervenes on. All the 
other solutions from the eighth group are ruled out for the exact same reasons as in the previous 
group. 
If my interpretation of AR-VII and AR-VIII is correct, then not only these solutions are 
worth considering, but they are also the most widespread ones in contemporary philosophy of 
mind. It is only right that they should join the ranks of the admissible solutions to the 
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Controversy, even if Ingarden includes them somewhat reluctantly and as if he was reasoning per 
absurdum for the sake of the completeness of his analysis. Looking back at the initial list of the 
eight generic positions regarding the real world and the eight groups of assumptions regarding 
pure consciousness, one might notice that a ninth combination has been left out in each. This 
corresponds to the cases where pure consciousness or the real world is heteronomous, 
selfsufficient and independent. However, such cases are left out for a good reason: they are 
impossible, because heteronomous entities can be either non-selfsufficient or dependent (if they 
are selfsufficient)23. There is no such thing as an independent heteronomous entity:  
(11) ∀x [~Autonomous(x) ∧ ~Non-selfsufficient(x) → ∃y Dependent(x, y)] 
This single axiom rules out no less than 17 additional solutions that shall therefore remain 
nameless. But Ingarden also takes into account an additional set of cases which he refers to as 
“double solutions”. Double solutions are hybrid, because they intertwine ontological and 
epistemological concerns. Ingarden tries to give a better idea of this peculiar category by 
analyzing two examples, found respectively in Kant and Bergson. According to him, Kant 
advocated a combination of Absolute Realism and Idealist Dependence Creationism: pure 
consciousness creates the phenomenal world, which is heteronomous, selfsufficient and 
dependent on it. But there is also the “real world” of things in themselves, which is autonomous, 
original, selfsufficient and independent. It is safe to assume that the variant of Absolute Realism 
which best characterizes the relation between the real world and pure consciousness is AR-II, 
given that consciousness existentially depends on things in themselves (if the latter are a 
necessary condition of conscious experience). In any case, this interpretation of Kantianism is at 
least very debatable. As Ingarden himself admits, Kant’s outlook on the Controversy has an 
epistemological starting point; for this reason, so-called “double solutions” appear to be nothing 
more than poor attempts at translating epistemological issues in a strictly ontological idiom. 
Ingarden often underlines that Husserl’s main mistake was to give the priority to epistemology 
over ontology; his own philosophical project can be seen as an effort to stand Husserl on his 
head, as it were, in order to restitute the primacy of ontology over both metaphysics and 
epistemology. Existential moments are ontological concepts: they serve the purpose of defining 
several kinds of existential dependence, rather than epistemic dependence. Therefore it seems 
that Ingarden, in addressing these cases of “double solutions”, ignored his own warning against 
the conflation of epistemological and ontological concerns. 
Let us assess the outcome of this investigation so far. Ingarden started with 64 solutions, out 
of which 49 were ruled out. This leaves us with 15 admissible simple solutions to the 
Controversy, plus one negative solution and an indefinite number of “double-solutions” (which 
can be ignored). There are already some issues with this preliminary result: I have shown that 
Ingarden’s reasoning is somewhat confused in his examination of the fifth group, since he 
admits a solution that he should logically reject (RUC-V), while he dismisses one that he should 
save at least in its weakened version (DUR-V). I will set this mistake aside for now, in order to 
give a clear outline of Ingarden’s own conclusions. The 15 solutions that have not been ruled out 
yet according to him are summed up in Fig. 1 below. 
This is not, however, the end of the existential-ontological analysis. They are still many 
solutions left because some additional existential moments have not yet been taken into account, 
namely the ones which are related to the analysis of time. With the help of these additional 
moments, Ingarden hopes to bring down the number of admissible solution below 15. 
 
                                                
23 Recall that only a selfsufficient entity can be dependent or independent. 











Ingarden introduces eight additional existential moments needed to define the way in which a 
given entity or existential domain is determined (or not) by the passage of time: 
1) activeness – non-activeness – post-activeness – empirical possibility (Aktualität – Nicht-
Aktualität – Post-Aktualität – Empirische Möglichkeit); 
2) fissuration – non-fissuration (Spalthaftigkeit – Nicht-Spalthaftigkeit);  
3) permanence24 – fragility (Dauerhaftigkeit – Gebrechlichkeit) 
An entity is active if it exists in time, and specifically if it presently exists. It is non-active if it exists, as 
it were, “outside of time”, in an eternal realm beyond any kind of temporal determination (such 
are ideal entities – ideal objects, relations and states of affairs – and purely intentional entities25). 
It is post-active if it exits in the past (one might be tempted to say “if it has existed”, but this would 
be slightly confusing since according to Ingarden past existence is a distinctive concept of being, 
not to be confused with mere non-being). It is empirically possible if it can exist, and indeed if it 
will: empirical possibility is an existential moment shared by future objects, processes, events and 
properties. An active entity is fissured if it is “trapped” in the passage of time, the present moment 
being metaphorically pictured as a fissure through which time flows; it is non-fissured if it does not 
depend in such a way on the passage of time through the present moment. Finally, an active 
entity is permanent if it exists “sempiternally”, meaning that it enjoys an everlasting existence in 
time without beginning or end; it is on the contrary fragile if it is perishable and will eventually 
come to an end. 
                                                
24 “Dauerhaftigkeit” is often translated by “persistence’’, but in my opinion this is very misleading since Ingarden 
frequently refers to real objects as “objects persisting in time” (in der Zeit verharrenden Gegenstände), and these precisely 
have the existential moment of Gebrechlichkeit, not Dauerhaftigkeit. In his translation of the Controversy, Arthur 
Szylewicz prefers to use the word “durability”, which is better, but still fails to convey the idea that entities endowed 
with Dauerhaftigkeit are never-ending. The best philosophical translation of the notion would probably be 
“sempiternity”, which indicates an infinite existence in time (whereas “eternity” might be associated to non-actuality, 
the idea of an existence outside of time). However, I opted for a simpler translation, “permanence”, which is 
consistent with the ordinary use of ‘Dauerhaftigkeit’ in German. 
25 Ingarden speaks of “Inaktualität” rather than “Nicht-Aktualität” in the case of purely intentional objects, processes, 
events and properties, but the basis of this distinction is not obvious: fictional objects such as Hamlet seem to exist 
outside of time. One might construe the notion of “inactiveness” as implying the idea of a discontinuous existence 
in time, which would be consistent with the fact that intentional entities are enacted in acts of consciousness. But it 
would be peculiar to say that the object Hamlet itself comes in and out of existence each time someone thinks about 
it. Besides, there is also a relation of existential derivation between the text Hamlet and the object Hamlet. 
Absolute 
Realisms













The world is not derived 
from consciousness
The world is derived 
from consciousness
The world is independent 
from consciousness
The world is dependent 
on consciousness
The world is 
autonomous
The world is 
heteronomous
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Based on Ingarden’s analysis, these definitions can be clarified and completed by the 
following existential axioms: 
(12)  ∀x Fissured(x) ∨ Non-fissured(x) → Active(x) 
(13) ∀x Fragile(x) ∨ Permanent(x) → Active(x) 
(14) ∀x Permanent(x) → Autonomous(x) ∧ Original(x) ∧ Selfsufficient(x) ∧ Independent(x) 
(15) ∀x Fragile(x) → Autonomous(x) ∧ Derivative(x) ∧ Fissured(x) 
(16) ∀x Active(x) → Autonomous(x) 
(17) ∀x Post-active(x) → Autonomous(x) ∧ Derivative(x) 
(18) ∀x Empirically Possible(x) → Heteronomous(x) ∧ Derivative(x) 
Therefore, by the axioms (16) and (17), if the real world is temporally determined – i.e. if its 
constituents are first active, then post-active as time goes by –, it has to exist autonomously; in 
this case IDC-I and IUC-I, according to which the real world is heteronomous, are ruled out. 
Similarly, if pure consciousness is temporally determined, it has to exist autonomously, which 
means that the seventh and eighth groups are disqualified – AR-VII and AR-VIII are ruled out.  
In order to draw this conclusion, Ingarden has to make three controversial assumptions. The 
first two regard the temporal determinations of the real world and pure consciousness 
respectively: how do we know that their constituents have the existential moments of activeness 
and post-activeness? The third one concerns the axioms (16) and (17) themselves: why is it that 
heteronomous entities cannot be active or post-active? Ingarden emphasizes the fact that the 
interpretation of these three assumptions rests on an ambiguity, which in turn bears on their 
assessment. This is why he starts by clarifying the axiom (16), in order to specify in what sense 
activeness and heteronomy are intertwined26. He does so by directly addressing a potential 
objection according to which heteronomous entities, such as purely intentional objects, can be 
active. One could argue for instance that Hamlet, despite being a heteronomous construct 
grounded in a literary text, is active: he is human, and as such he is born, he dies, and he lives 
through time; therefore he seems fragile, fissured and indeed active. However it is easy to see 
that there is something wrong with this line of reasoning: as Ingarden puts it, entities existing in 
real time are characterized by “genuine activeness”, whereas fictional entities are immersed in a 
“merely intentionally projected time”. This important distinction was introduced in 1931 in the 
§36 of Das literarische Kunstwerk (henceforth Kunstwerk) – a work actually conceived as a 
preliminary study for Controversy. In Kunstwerk, Ingarden explains that the “time” of a literary 
work of art is nothing more than the order of succession of what takes place in the story. There is no 
real past, present and future in the heteronomous realm of the works of art, only intentional 
events taking place in a predefined order. One should be careful not to confuse the temporal 
aspect of the act of reading, for instance, with a real temporal determination of intentional 
entities. As Ingarden puts it, in a work of art one finds a “leveling” of all temporal instants 
through a mere order of succession, because intentional entities do not pass through a phase of 
genuine in actu esse. Interestingly, this analysis echoes J.M.E. McTaggart’s famous distinction 
between two fundamental ways of describing time, the A-series and the B-series27: the A-series 
                                                
26 In this whole development, Ingarden ignores the entailment I have formulated as the axiom (17), because it 
simply follows from (16): temporally determined entities pass through the “activeness-sphere”, as he puts it, being 
successively active then post-active. Therefore, a post-active entity has been active before, and since an autonomous 
entity cannot become heteronomous, it has to remain autonomous if (16) is true. 
27 J.M.E. McTaggart, 1908, “The Unreality of Time”, Mind, 17, pp. 457-73. Ingarden himself never mentions 
McTaggart, and is rather influenced by Bergson when he draws this distinction. 




resorts to indexical terms such as “past”, “present” and “future”, which are necessarily 
relativized to a certain position in time, whereas the B-series only uses a relation of antecedence 
between times (“earlier than”/“later than”), which is absolute. To paraphrase Ingarden’s idea, in 
McTaggart’s lexicon, the time of purely intentional entities is reducible to the B-series, while real 
time is not, because it can only be described with the A-series. Ingarden generalizes this idea to 
conclude that there is no past, present and future in the realm of heteronomous entities – only a 
virtual order of succession. In other words: real time involves real passage, whereas projected time 
is purely static. 
In Controversy, Ingarden goes on to say that this distinction is not satisfactory as it stands, 
because it was implicitly justified in Kunstwerk by the assumption that the real world is 
autonomous – since in this previous work he was only concerned with the status of fictional 
entities. The argument found in Kunstwerk can be abridged in the following way28: 
(1) The real world is existentially autonomous. 
(2) If the real world is autonomous, its objects pass through real time. 
(3) Intentional entities are existentially heteronomous. 
(4) If intentional entities are heteronomous, their temporal determination is merely an 
analogue of the temporal determination of worldly objects. 
(5) Therefore, intentional entities do not pass through real time. 
Obviously, the premise (1) would beg the question in the existential-ontological analysis of 
Controversy. Consequently, Ingarden attempts to establish the same distinction between two 
different kinds of times while avoiding the risk of a vicious circle. He starts by acknowledging 
the existence of a phenomenal difference between actual time (given in experience) and the 
intentionally projected time: we directly experience the privileged status of the present moment, 
which is distinctive of real time. Real time is irreducibly perspectival, which is why it can only be 
described with the A-series: an event e is present, past or future depending on which time is 
taken as the referential of this statement (in the Middle Ages, my act of writing this sentence was 
a future event; but as you are currently reading the sentence on print, it belongs to the past). 
However, there is no such thing as the experience of temporal presence in the intentionally 
projected time. While reading Alice in Wonderland, it would not make sense to say that Alice is 
presently jumping in a rabbit hole – except metaphorically. Therefore, Ingarden believes that he 
has found a legitimate basis to distinguish in a non-circular way (a) genuine activeness, 
corresponding to a description of time which requires the A-series, and (b) putative activeness, 
corresponding to a time which can only be accurately described with the B-series. “Putative 
activeness” refers to an apparent activeness that is intentionally ascribed to an entity’s concept of 
being: the real source of such an “activeness” is external to the entity – it belongs to the subject 
of the intentional act29. Secondly, he argues that there is a necessary link between (i) genuine 
activeness and genuine autonomy on the one hand, and (ii) putative activeness and putative autonomy 
on the other hand: 
(16*)  ∀x Genuinely Active(x) → Genuinely Autonomous(x). 
(16**)  ∀x Putatively Active(x) → Putatively Autonomous(x). 
Putative autonomy, of course, is only heteronomy in disguise: again, Hamlet’s “autonomy” as a 
human being is intentionally ascribed from the outside, and does not belong to the concept of 
being of the heteronomous object called “Hamlet”. Ingarden appears to believe that these 
                                                
28 See Kunstwerk, p. 247 and Controversy, pp. 282-3. 
29 When I say metaphorically that Alice is “presently” jumping in a rabbit hole, what I really mean is that I am 
presently narrating or reading the part of Alice’s story where she is said to jump in the hole. Thus I am merely 
referring to the order of succession of events in the story, but I associate it, in a rather misleading way, to the real 
time of my act of reading. 
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entailments are ultimately grounded in experience: we always experience genuine activeness 
together with genuine autonomy, because only genuinely autonomous things can really change in 
time. It is impossible to imagine something that would be genuinely active and yet fail to be 
genuinely autonomous. Merely intentional constructs are not genuinely situated in time, nor do 
they really change in time. In that respect, the crux of the Controversy comes down to whether 
or not the real world shares the mode of being of the “worlds” of works of art. 
Ultimately, Ingarden acknowledges that the ontological analysis cannot and should not tell us 
if the real world, or at least some part of it, is genuinely or putatively active. It can only validate 
conditional statements such as (16*) and (16**). Accordingly, he claims to have established the 
following: an entity is genuinely temporal only if it is genuinely active in the present (that is to say 
if its situation in time can only be completely specified with the A-series); and in turn genuine 
activeness entails genuine autonomy. But at this stage, the (genuine) temporal determination of 
the real world is only a hypothesis. What about the temporal determination of pure 
consciousness? Ingarden does not really elaborate on this point in the first volume of Controversy, 
not even to ground it in experience: it also remains a hypothesis at this stage. Thus any further 
dismissal of possible solutions to the Controversy within the boundaries of an existential 
investigation depends on hypothetical statements. We have only examined two of them so far: 
(HYPOTHESIS 1)  The real world is temporally determined. 
(HYPOTHESIS 2)  Pure consciousness is temporally determined. 
If HYPOTHESIS 1 is true, then by the definition of temporal determination as genuine activeness 
and by (16*) the real world is really autonomous, ruling out IDC-I and IUC-I. Likewise, if 
HYPOTHESIS 2 is true, pure consciousness is genuinely autonomous, ruling out AR-VII and AR-
VIII. But Ingarden also considers two additional hypotheses30: 
(HYPOTHESIS 3)  The real world is fragile. 
(HYPOTHESIS 4)  Pure consciousness is fragile. 
If HYPOTHESIS 3 is true, then by (15) the real world is derivative, ruling out all variants of 
absolute realism (AR-I, AR-II, AR-III, AR-IV, AR-V, AR-VI, AR-VII, AR-VIII) and DR-II. 
Likewise, if HYPOTHESIS 4 is true, pure consciousness is derivative; but according to Ingarden 
this does not straightforwardly rule out any additional solution, because the ones in which pure 
consciousness is not derived from the real world do not exclude its derivation from a third factor 
(since no solution directly assumes that pure consciousness is original). 
With the third and fourth hypotheses (bearing in mind that they respectively entail the first 
and the second), no less than 11 solutions are ruled out, leaving only the four variants of realist 
creationism: AC-I, RDC-I, RUC-I and RUC-V. In the conclusion of the existential analysis, 
Ingarden is hopeful about the remainder of his investigation: the formal and material analyses of 
pure consciousness and of the real world should respectively tell us if HYPOTHESIS 2 and 
HYPOTHESIS 3 are true, and if so the final metaphysical analysis should determine which one of 
the four remaining solutions is correct. Unfortunately, there are a number of issues with the 
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30 Note that these are stronger, because they respectively entail the first and second hypotheses by the axiom (13). 
This development can be found in the §33 of Controversy. 




The second stage of the existential investigation is, in a way, disappointing: the introduction of 
temporal moments is not sufficient by itself to narrow down the number of admissible solutions 
below 15. It only serves to formulate a few existential axioms that should eventually, together 
with four hypotheses to be tested by further formal and material analyses, rule out a number of 
solutions. There are two problems at this stage: first, even if the hypotheses later prove to be 
true, the remaining solutions include RUC-V – which, as I have shown, should have been ruled 
out by Ingarden31. Admittedly, this can be good news if it brings down the number of definitely 
admissible solutions to 3 at the end of the ontological investigation. But there is a much bigger 
issue: over the course of his analysis, Ingarden has often considered weaker versions of the 
proposed solutions, according to which the real world is not original but merely not derived from 
pure consciousness. If we allow these weaker versions, HYPOTHESIS 3 is unable to rule out any 
solution, because the real world can be derived from a third factor. In addition, I have shown 
that under such a reading DUR-V should be admissible and not ruled out. This means that even 
if the four hypotheses were true, 11 solutions would still be left. Ingarden is aware of this issue, 
and addresses it by arguing that the admission of a third factor from which the real world could 
be derived would contravene to the transcendental nature of his analysis. Indeed, the whole 
investigation of the Controversy revolves around the relation between pure consciousness and 
the real world, given that our own phenomenological starting point is found in conscious 
experience. On the other hand, however, Ingarden allows solutions according to which pure 
consciousness is not derived from the real world; given HYPOTHESIS 4, this means that pure 
consciousness is derived from a third factor. Does it also force us to relinquish the 
transcendental mode of analysis? Ingarden does not think so, otherwise he would rule out such 
cases. But precisely, AC-I, RDC-I, RUC-I and RUC-V, namely all the solutions that would be 
left if the four hypotheses were true, involve the assumption that pure consciousness is derived 
from a third factor! Forbidding this possibility would thus have a disastrous outcome: depending 
on the result of the formal and material analyses, it could rule out every solution to the 
Controversy, thereby disqualifying the whole investigation as fallacious.  
This is for Ingarden a strong incentive to allow the possibility of pure consciousness being 
derived from a third factor; but in this case it is not clear why the same possibility should not be 
allowed for the real world. One reason could be that since the transcendental starting point of 
ontology is pure consciousness, one could extend the existential analysis by investigating the 
relation between the latter and the third factor from which it is allegedly derived. This could yield 
a great number of additional combinations, depending on the existential moments attributed to 
the third factor. But if pure consciousness is autonomous, by the axiom (10) the third factor 
cannot be heteronomous. Furthermore, if it is derived, then we risk a regressio ad infinitum – since 
the third factor creates pure consciousness, it can only be derived from a fourth factor, etc. 
Therefore it has to be original; by the axioms (1) and (2), this means that it must also be 
selfsufficient and independent. In other words, the mode of being of the third factor must be 
absolute. This would still leave a number of options regarding the way in which pure 
consciousness is related to this third factor: is it selfsufficient and independent with respect to it? 
Regardless of the combinations that could be obtained from this examination, there is a bigger 
worry: it is dubious that the putative third factor could be subjected to formal and material 
analyses at all. Indeed, this domain of being is wholly mysterious: unlike the real world, we have 
no access to it, and its very existence is speculative. In fact, the postulation of an absolute third 
factor looks like a very unusual kind of theism. 
Thus we stand at a crossroads. Consider the three following options: 
a) Neither pure consciousness nor the real world can be derived from a third factor. 
b) Pure consciousness can be derived from a third factor while the real world cannot. 
                                                
31 He nonetheless rules out both variants of Realist Unity Creationism (RUC-I and RUC-V) in the formal analysis. 
See Streit, II.2, pp. 373-99.  
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c) Both pure consciousness and the real world can be derived from a third factor. 
Now assume that HYPOTHESES 1-4 are true. If we choose the option (a), all 64 combinations are 
ruled out. Even the Negative Solution is dismissed, because it still assumes that consciousness is 
original (which contradicts HYPOTHESIS 4). In other words, this option entails the truth of 
ontological nihilism (a doubly negative solution, as it were). This is absurd32: either one or several 
of the existential axioms/hypotheses are false, or Ingarden’s method is deficient as a whole. If 
we prefer the option (b), there is an absolute domain of being (God?) which creates 
consciousness, while the latter creates the world. Only three solutions are admissible: AC-I, 
RDC-I and RUC-I33. Finally, if we favor the option (c), 11 solutions are admissible, but the 
transcendental mode of analysis is undermined. According to Ingarden, this would require us to 
give up the transcendental stance altogether and start the whole investigation anew on shaky 
methodological grounds. None of these three outcomes are very appealing. The first and last 
options compromise the whole project of Controversy. The second one, chosen by Ingarden34, is 
doubly dubitable: not only does it force us to speculate about an absolute domain of being the 
sole purpose of which is to ground the existence of pure consciousness, but it also assumes that 
the postulation of this third factor is innocuous for the transcendental mode of analysis if only 
pure consciousness is derived from it. Both of these requirements might seem somewhat 
arbitrary. 
There is however a deeper reason for the aporetic nature of Ingarden’s project: the 
metaphysical analysis which was supposed to follow the ontological stage is inherently 
problematic. Indeed, metaphysics is supposed to single out the actual solution to the 
Controversy; even if ontology ended up with a single possible solution at the end of the formal 
and material analyses – which does not seem to be the case – metaphysics would still have to 
ground it in actual facts. But Ingarden’s phenomenological starting point is the immanent sphere 
of pure consciousness: from there how can one expect to gain insight into actual facts 
concerning the mode of being of the real world? Ontology is entirely a priori: as I have shown, it 
implicitly relies on classical formal logic to explore the realm of pure possibilities. Ruling out 
combinations of existential moments based on the rule of non-contradiction is one thing; 
discovering the actual mode of being of the world is another. In a way, Ingarden tried to explore 
a middle path between classical ontology (Aristotelian and medieval “metaphysics”) and 
Husserlian phenomenology characterized by the initial epochè. In the end, however, he was 
trapped in his transcendental stance, which forbade the way to metaphysics. He seems to realize 
this himself towards the end of the formal-ontological stage of his investigation: 
“It seems that exactly the absolutely certain viewpoint of the whole controversy about the 
existence of the world, by starting from the immanently accessible pure consciousness and 
by carrying out the analyses in the sphere of immanence, is the reason for the failure which 
we reach at the end of our inquiry35.” 
Despite this avowed “failure”, Ingarden refuses to give up the standpoint of the transcendental 
reduction, which he still considers as a precious achievement for philosophy. He conjectures that 
the material analysis of pure consciousness will be able to unveil interesting correlations that will 
ultimately give us some insight into the real nature of the world. As we know, he never 
                                                
32 Ingarden clearly says that the existence of pure consciousness is indubitable, as opposed to the existence of the 
real world. 
33 On a side note, if the real world can only be derived from pure consciousness, HYPOTHESIS 3 is not even needed 
to rule out DR-II because the axiom (2) already does. In other words, even if it turns out that the real world is not 
fragile, only 14 or 10 solutions are admissible on purely existential grounds (depending on whether the real world 
and pure consciousness are temporally determined). 
34 On the possible derivativeness of pure consciousness, see for instance Controversy, p. 169 and p. 178. On the 
originality of the real world, see ibid, p. 299. 
35 Streit, II.2, p. 395. 




performed this material analysis, let alone the metaphysical investigation which was supposed to 
follow, and the third unachieved volume of Controversy focuses on the philosophy of causation.  
What is the final result of Ingarden’s examination of the Controversy? At the end of the 
formal-ontological analysis, which confirms HYPOTHESES 1-4 and rules out Realist Unity 
Creationism, only two solutions are left standing: AC-I and RDC-I36. Both are variants of realist 
creationism, meaning that pure consciousness is supposed to create an autonomous world. The 
only difference between the two is that the second is an instance of creatio continua, where the 
world existentially depends on pure consciousness at all times. But can we even make sense of 
the idea that consciousness literally creates an autonomous world? Not really, as Ingarden 
eventually admits, if we think of human consciousness, which is also supposed to be derived38. 
Only something like a divine mind could create an autonomous world. However this Cartesian 
move is forbidden: assuming that “pure consciousness” refers to something else than human 
consciousness jeopardizes the whole project, and violates the transcendental stance. No matter 
how we try to interpret the outcome of Ingarden’s investigation, it seems to be a failure insofar 
as it was conceived as an attempt to solve the Controversy for good. This does not mean that 
there is nothing to save in his analysis, since some of the axioms and hypotheses he uses to rule 
out certain positions are controversial. For instance, one could criticize his analysis of time 
(especially his assumptions regarding the irreducibility of the A-series to describe real time), and 
reject the axiom (16). As a result, AR-VII and AR-VIII would remain promising solutions to the 
Controversy; not only are they intelligible, but they are also compatible with prominent theories 
in contemporary philosophy of mind, and consistent with scientific facts. In any case, Ingarden’s 
fine-grained distinctions between several kinds of ontological dependence are very interesting in 
their own right, and anticipate recent developments in the metaphysics of dependence and 
grounding39. Finally, the central thesis according to which existence is polysemous, and that 
different combinations of existential moments yield different modes of being, is making a 
comeback in recent years under the guise of ontological pluralism40. As archaic as the idea of a 
controversy over the existence of the world might seem today, Controversy remains a very 
impressive philosophical accomplishment full of fascinating insights in formal ontology. I hope 
to have given a faithful glimpse of this conceptual wealth, which should at least pique the 









                                                
36 Streit, II.2, pp. 373-99. 
38 In his initial examination of AC-I, Ingarden writes: “One would therefore have to attribute to pure consciousness 
a genuinely creative power, which – if, as presupposed, it is a matter of the consciousness that is in fact experienced 
by us – is surely not seriously done by anyone” (Controversy, p. 175). 
39 Cf. for instance K. Fine, 2012, “Guide to Ground”, in F. Correia and B. Schnieder (eds.), 2012, Metaphysical 
Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 37-80; and F. Correia, 
2005, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, Munich, Philosophia Verlag. 
40 Kr. McDaniel, 2009, “Ways of Being”, in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R. Wasserman (eds.), 2009, Metametaphyics, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 290-219; J. Turner, 2010, “Ontological Pluralism”, The Journal of Philosophy 52 
(1), pp. 5-34. 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: a synoptic diagram of Ingarden’s ontology 
 
 
